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I. INTRODUCTORY. 
1 
The world around, governments recognize that the economic 
transformaton many of them desire demands new laws. Some seek to 
accomplish a transition from centrally-planned to various kinds of 
market economies. Other, third world countries aim to change 
institutions inherited from the colonial era to those more 
appropriate for attaining self-reliant national economies. In 
South Africa, the newly elected government seeks to transform its 
apartheid-stained institutions. 
Enacted laws reflect their origins as bills. Bills serve as 
midwives to legislation. 3 They do not all end as laws, unchanged. 
They do, however, ineluctably frame the structure of the laws that 
emerge from the law-making process (Rubin, 1993) . 4 Everywhere, 
1 International Development and Social Change Program, Clark 
University, and Boston University School of Law. 
2 Boston University School of Law. 
3 The process of creating that bill we denote 'bill-making', 
distinguishing it from the processes by which collective elected 
decision-makers decide to make a bill into a law (call that 'the 
legislative process') and the entire process of bill creation and 
the legislative process ('law-making'). 
4 It is a "fact of legislative life" that "the first version 
of a problem and its proposed solution often are the only 
articulations seriously considered during the legislative process"; 
, . 
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bills looking to transform institutions have mainly resulted in 
laws that do not succeed in their transformational purposes. More 
than anything else, that reflects their drafters' lack of a 
legislative theory. 
Legislation constitutes the bridge between policy and 
governmental action. How to translate the frequently abstract 
dictates of policy into the details of a bill that government can 
actually implement? How to "bridge the gap between the conceiving 
of ideas and the writing of legislative bills"? (Davies, 1986:135; 
cf. R.B.Seidman, ~- How to frame "problems for legislative 
at tent ion and [select] appropriate legislative responses?" (Gauvin, 
1994:1284). Like all decision-makers, for translating policy into 
the details of implementable legislation, the officials or others 
who have a hand either in formulating the legislative programme or 
writing the bill itself require such a guide. That guide 
constitutes a legislative theory' . 
Without an explicit theory to guide their formulation of 
legislative programs, drafters too often resort to either copying 
'model laws' or 'international standards, ' 5 or drafting bills that 
legislators tend to address new concerns by adding or deleting 
provisions from the original bill (Gauvin, 1994:1344) 
5 Davies, 1986: 135 (" ... the most efficient mechanism, to 
obtain bills is plagiarism. ") Both local drafters and foreign 
consultants deny that they copy foreign laws. Nevertheless, as 
often as not, without adequate research as to specific national 
circumstances, they do exactly that. Advised by French 
consul tan ts, for example, the Lao government copied a French 
contract law that required notaries public to register companies; 
but Laos had neither a law establishing the office of notaries 
public nor any notaries. Two years later, Lao passed a notaries 
public law. To date, that has not produced any notaries. In 
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merely define the desired future state of affairs in normative 
terms. 6 They frequently propose enforcement by imposing unworkable 
penal sanctions (Kulcsar,1992:255), or leave the administrators to 
figure out how to reach their normative goal. Neither works. 
Absent an adequate theory to guide the bill-making process, 
government cannot use logic and facts (that is, reason informed by 
experience) in employing law to achieve the institutional 
transformations that lie at development's core. The alternatives 
appear everywhere dramatically: In China, a Cultural Revolution 
that substituted 'struggle' for reason: in Cambodia, the killing 
fields; in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and a dozen others, ethnic 
cleansing; in apartheid South Africa, Argentina, East Timor, and 
others, government-sposored murder, torture, and 'disappearances.' 
Less dramatically but as deadly, other governments followed 
policies dictated not by reason informed by experience, but by 
ideological purity, and slid into the economic abyss: Mexico, 
Zambia, Kenya, a host of countries choked by structural adjustment 
Belize, a drafter in the Solicitor General's office copied a law, 
designed to protect new roads from overweight trucks, that required 
the weighing of trucks. Belize had no weigh station, and the law 
remains unimplementable. Lesotho, too, copied a similar provision 
from South African l~like Belize, Lesotho had no weigh station. 
R. B. Seidman, 1978~ 
6 Von Benda-Bechmann, 1989 :133-34 "Scapegoat and Magic Charm: 
Law in Development Theory and Practice", 28 J. Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 133-34 (1989). ("The idea of legal engineering, of 
achieving social and economic shape through government law, still 
ranks foremost in the arsenal of development techniques. Law as a 
desired situation projected into the future is used as a magic 
charm. The law-maker seeks to capture desired economic and social 
conditions, and the practice supposed to lead towards them, in 
normative terms, and leaves the rest to law-enforcement, or 
expressed more generally, to the implementation of policy.") 
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programs and blind subservience to the market Moloch. 
Strangely, despite the imperative need, neither legal 
practitioners nor academics seriously addressed the task of 
formulating such a theory (Gouvin:1284 n.7) 7 This paper aims, 
first, to suggest some reasons for that puzzling hiatus; sec ond, to 
tease out of cognate theories of law- and policy-making a useful 
legislative theory (in the event, an all but fruitless task); and, 
third, to explicate the elements which an adequate legislative 
theory must incorporate. 
II. WHY NO LEGISLATIVE THEORY? 
In U. S . society, legal academics have the social role to 
research and write about law-related topics. They have written 
whole forests of articles about how judges do and ought to decide 
what the law ought to be; 8 theories of judicial decision come a-
plenty. They have written practically nothing about how drafters 
address the same issue. Four factors seem to explain that 
strange dearth of academic efforts to formulate a theory of bill-
creating: (1) The myth that legislative drafting only translates 
7 Besides his own, in the English-language literature Gouvin 
found only two articles concerning legislative methodology: Rubin 
(1993) and Seidman (1993). As Chief Technical Advisors for a five 
year UNDP project to assist China's Bureau of Legislative Affairs 
to draft 22 priority economic laws, identified in the 1989 Five 
year Plan, to assist in the implementation of China's Reforms and 
Open Policy, we have talked with over 100 consultants, many of whom 
have sought to assist various governments with their drafting 
tasks. Without exception, they have observed that they have not 
found a legislative theory to guide their efforts. 
8 By now, it has become well-accepted that in cases in which 
the parties disagree about the applicable law, by deciding that 
question a judge 'creates' law. See, e.g., Holmes, 1909. 
Seidmans: The Present State of Legislative Theory 5 
well-formulated policies into legal language, a mere technical 
skill; (2) the ideological force of market-oriented economic 
theories; (3) the law schools' focus on law and courts as the 
central core of legal education and research; and (4) the 
pervasive impact of philosophical positivism. 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MYTH 
In common-law contries, history fostered the myth that 
legislative drafting constituted only a technical skill 
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1981) . In 1869, to avoid contradictions 
and confusion in the law, Britain's newly-appointed Parliamentary 
Counsel required that all legislation, no matter in what ministry 
it originated, had to pass through a central drafting office. To 
ward off complaints about power-grabbing, the Counsel asserted 
what became a powerful, pervasive myth: Its staff simply 
reviewed proposed laws to ensure they assumed the proper legal 
form (cf. Thring, 1902). The originating ministry determined 
policy. The drafters merely translated those policies into the 
law's precise if obscure language (Luce, 1922, quoting McCarthy, 
1922; Davies, 1986:139) For that, they needed no legislative 
theory. Policy, not law, counted as important (Griffiths, 1976) 
That myth obscured reality: In working out the details of 
specific bills, drafters shaped their operative policies (Purdy~f(Y-, 
67, 80). Nevertheless, the myth rationalized teaching drafters, 
not legislative theory, but forms and techniques. 
The creation of the off ice of Parliamentary Counsel aimed at 
ensuring clarity and harmony in the law (Seidman, 1981) . That 
' ' 
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flowed from how the ideology of the free market conceived of the 
uses of law. 
B. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE FREE MARKET 
Free market ideologies contributed to warping legal 
scholarship's focus on courts by affirmatively denigrating law's 
function. In orthodox economic theory, free markets only result 
in the best social allocation of resources if all economic actors 
pursue their perceived economic interests. Government 77 S-Z..~ ATTl""-J' rt.:- . 0 ,,.,--r 5 -Z<"C. i tr I intervention thwarts this optimal outcome (Pareto . Law 1He:- z"T.\:-(· \C:...A\ 1 ~ 1 r .?L:> \ 1-t 1 c,o I 
constitutes the most wide-spread form of governmental bZ'> S. • ' 
intervention. 
That presented a paradox. If only to define mine and thine, 
no market can exist without a legal framework Without law, one 
cannot have any market at all. Yet law unavoidably embodies 
government interferences in economic decision-making. Without 
law, no market; with law, no truly 'free' market: Free-market 
than studying law-making in leg'i atures, their research focused 
all but exclusively on courts. 
C. THE FOCUS ON COURTS 
Legal academics do most research on the law. A rich broth 
9 See below, text at n.~ The paradox received its most 
famous attept at resolution in~ Coase Theorem. Coase, 1962. One 
interpretation of Coase's famous article held that it proved that 
the sort of law that structured a market didnot matter, so long as 
-some- law ex~· . , market actors would bargain their way around 
it. Buchanan, 19 .~ 
r 
y (ct 1t v · ycl; <--f / 17 pv--?' r-evJ: j ~ \_,--zvj ? I/ 
. . 
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o f history and ideology nourished yet another myth, widespread in 
legal academia, that courts hold stage-center (Dworkin, 1986) 
In the 18th Century, English courts functioned as the law's 
principal implementing agency (Dawson, 1960). That function 
married happily with liberal notions that governments functioned 
properly when they touched the economy only by providing the 
necessary legal framework for the market: Contract, property and 
tort laws. Competing market actors bargained, inevitably 
engaging in disputes which the courts resolved. Law did not 
primarily address market actors, but the courts, advising them 
how to resolve those disputes (xx; article about codification) . 
Lawyers mainly worked in courts. With respect of legislation, 
that justified teaching law students nothing about legislatures 
and law-making, but only how courts interpreted laws already 
made. 10 
Today, American and British legal academics still mainly 
focus on the courts' dispute settlement role (Parsons 1962; 
Posner 1986) . They primarily train lawyers to defend their 
clients inside -- or in the shadow of -- the courthouse. Only at 
the margins of authoritative rules do courts address issues about 
what the law ought to become (Holmes 1909) . Law school 
legislation courses mainly consider, not how to make legislation, 
but to construe it (See, e.g., Eskridge and Frickey, 1988; 
Nutting and Dickerson, 1978) . The legal academics' educational 
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duties inevitably shape their research interests. That court-
centred perspective found support in positivist philosophies. 
8 
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIVISM 
Legislation always states how people ought to behave. Bill-
creating involves deciding what the law ought to be. Both 
involve 'value choice'. As the dominant philosophical school 
from the nineteenth century until today, positivism insists on a 
discontinuity between values and facts: No one can prove the 
Ought from the Is. Hence legislation must rest, not on reason 
informed by experience, but the values of those who decide; law-
making rests on power. Lawyers claim to work with reason; legal 
academics study reasonable arguments. Political scientists study 
power relationships. 
The myth of drafters' neutrality, the court-centered law-
school ethos, the imperatives of market-oriented economic 
theories, and the dictates of philosophical positivism: 
Combined, these explain the remarkably low level of efforts to 
develop legislative theory. Political scientists busied 
themselves, not with devising legislative theories to aid 
drafters, but with general theories of the law-making process as 
a whole. Only a few sociologists and some economists even 
considered the problems of people's behaviors in the face of a 
law. 
III. INCHOATE THEORIES ABOUT LAW-MAKING 
Despite the practically complete void of theories explicitly 
designed to guide drafters' substantive decision-making, 
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seemingly at least partially-relevant theories floated about, 
inchoate. This section discusses (1) theories about law-making 
derived from notions of interest group bargaining (pluralism and 
public choice), and from Marxism; (2) neo-republicanism with its 
reliance on 'practical reason'; (3) decision-making 
methodologies, especially ends-means and incrementalism; and (4) 
the realist model and two of its too-narrow legatees, sociology 
of law and law and economics. Of these, only the realist model 
provided even a seed-bed for an adequate legislative theory. 
9 
A. GENERALIZED DESCRIPTIONS OF THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 
Although they offered no guide to drafters engaged in 
creating bills, political scientists by the score did analyze the 
law-making process. Libertarianism's legislative theory, 
republicanism, proposed a 'civics class' model of the 
legislative process that used the free market as a metaphor for 
the political world. The managers of private organizations 
(political parties) competed for votes; having won the right to 
organize the Government for a stated period of time, the winners 
supposedly carried out their promises to the electorate. In 
republican theory, "Legislators are motivated to solve those 
[social] problems [as identified by the citizenry] out of a sense 
of civic duty. They do not make special deals for themselves or 
act solely to ensure their reelection." (Gouvin, 1994:1287n). 
Law-making rarely worked as the republican ideal advertised. 
Former colonial masters bequeathed to the third world generally 
libertarian constitutions, replete with parliaments, independent 
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judiciaries and bills of right. Nevertheless, as in the first, 
so in the third world: Most governments used state power to aid, 
not the mass, but the rich and powerful. Political scientists 
tumbled over each other to explain that phenomenonm, and out of 
their variegated descriptive theories one can infer (usually with 
some difficulty) a hotchpot of normative prescriptions for 
drafters. 
1. Interest group theories. To explain governments' 
tendencies to favor the rich and powerful, ever since Madison 
(Federalist #10, 1864), many theorists have stressed the role of 
interest groups. In Madison's view, representative government 
and a network of checks and balances safeguarded against faction 
(Federalist #51) . In 20th century US practice, the law-making 
process usually begins with a bill unsullied by empirical 
research (Rubin 1993; Gouvin 1994). That bill goes to a 
congressional committee that holds hearings at which various 
members of the public and experts, many invited by the committee 
staff, testify. 11 In principle, through these hearings the 
committee educates itself about the relevant facts. In reality, 
the hearing serves not as a search for facts, but as a fo r um at 
which different interest groups and the committee bargain over 
the bill's terms (Rubin, 1993; Gauvin, 1994). 
U.S. political scientists (i.e . , most of the world's 
political scientists) generalized from that experience. They 
11 Committee staff frequently warp the hearings by engaging 
only experts who will support the bill (Gauvin 1994). 
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held that not only in the U.S. but everywhere the law-making 
process rested on interest group bargaining. In effect, they 
read back from how U.S. institutions worked to an immutable 
principle of law-making: All law emerged out of a bargaining 
process among society's many competing interest groups (Carnoy 
1984:9). From that they derived a set of normative propositions: 
The State should maintain a neutral framework, the famous 'level 
playing field,' to facilitate the political bargaining process 
between interest groups. 12 From pluralism, a drafter might 
infer two principal injunctions: To ensure (1) formally 'fair' 
procedures (cf. Trubeck and Galanter, 1973), and (2) bills that 
respond to the claims and demands of all the stakeholders (Brody, 
Rutherford, Vietzen and Dernbach, 1994) . 13 However level the 
playing field, any prescription for law-making that prescribes 
bargaining favors the powerful. Schattschneider put it bluntly: 
"the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus 
sings with a strong upper-class accent.'' (Schattschneider, 
1960:35; cf. Mill, 1861) If all law comes from bargains 
dominated by the powerful, those forces in effect hold the state 
captive (Bachrach & Baratz 1963) . No matter the trappings of 
1 2 This re-introduced in a new form an old paradox (Carnoy, 
1984:37) How can a state refrain from intervening in political 
bargaining and at the same time intervene to structure that very 
process? 
13 The trials and tribulations of the Clinton administration's 
public health bill illustrates this model's weaknesses. The 
principal justification for that bill lay in the process of 
consultation and accommodation of interests that produced the bill. 
At the end of the day, the result resembled the camel, that is, a 
horse designed by a committee. 
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liberal, electoral democracy, in the pluralist's world, to seek 
to change institutions to empower the poor and disinherited 
chases sunbeams. Public choice theories advanced no more hopeful 
a future. 
Public choice theorists sought to analyze bargaining either 
between interest groups and government officials, or in wh ich 
those officials acted as brokers (Fiorina 1977; Mayhew, 1974) 
For a 'price,' officials supplied (and implemented) the laws 
demanded by interest groups. The officials' 'price' depended 
upon their own interests: In the Unied States, presumably re - -;!;'-
election; in many other countries, numbered Swiss bank accounts. 
Everywhere, fractions of the oligarchy bid against each other to 
'buy' the laws they wanted from officials (or at to 'buy' at 
least officials' assistance in bargaining with opposing group 
interests) . In this competition, the bidders' 'market' produces 
the most efficient outcome - - even if they bid corruptly (Leff, 
1964; Nye, 1967). 
In effect conforming to this public choice mode, some 
drafting texts advise drafters to treat the instructing 
authorities as clients (Brody, Rutherford, Vietzen and Dernbach, 
1994). A drafter should draft a bill to carry out the 
authorities' wishes, just as a competent attorney should draft a 
will to carry out the client's wishes. In practice, of course, 
that raises serious ethical issues. Unlike the lawyer who drafts 
wills, real estate deeds or contracts between private actors, the 
legislative drafter has a public responsibility and a 
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corresponding ethical injunction (Purdy, 1987). Moreover, as 
with most private actors, so with legislators: They rarely know 
what sort of a bill they want. Typically, they identify a 
problem, and leave the drafter to discover the means of resolving 
it. The notion that government officials really know the details 
of the bill they propose for anything more than the simplest 
bills whistles with the shrimps. 
These varied versions of new social Darwinism all ended by 
accepting -- some even celebrated the political and economic 
power of the privileged, leaving for the poor only their poverty 
and powerlessness. They taught that law cannot transform 
existing institutions, at least to the extent that existing 
institutions favor the powerful. In consequence, none offered a 
guide to formulating transformatory legislation. Despite its 
revolutionary robes, neither did Marxist legal theory. 
2. Marxism. Rooted in historical materialism (but cf. 
Resnick & Wolff 1988:47; Burawoy 1990), Marxists viewed the world 
as characterized, not by the libertarians' rosy consensus, but 
deep-seated conflict. Capitalist political economies constitute 
systems of power (Samuels 1979) . Everywhere, ruling class power 
manifests itself through such institutions as land ownership, 
transnational corporations and banks, courts, public 
corporations, ministries and cabinets. Everywhere, ruling 
classes shaped the law in their own interests. 
To explain this, many Marxists adopted a crude metaphor: The 
'basis' (the mode of production) determined the 'superstru cture' 
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(that is, ideas and culture, including the legal order) (Jessop 
1982:15). As part of the superstructure, the state serves as the 
executive committee of the capitalist class. That crude metaphor 
served Marx's and Engel's revolutionary purpose: To persuade the 
masses to seize state power. The revolution having succeeded, 
however, that metaphor did nothing to instruct the new government 
how to use state and law to transform the institutions that 
embodied ruling class power. 
The basis-superstrucure model implied one-way causation: 
First a ruling class came into being, and then it used the state 
and the legal order to accomplish its ends (but see Engels 1969; 
Seidman, R. B. 1984b). Because existing institutions and law 
ineluctably reflect the basis, the basis-superstructure model 
pours cold water on the notion that the new, revolutionary rulers 
can use law to transform those very institutions (Williams, 
19 8 0) . 14 
14 Alternatively construed, Marxism held the germ of a 
legislative theory that a drafter might use. If one perceives the 
base-superstructure relataionship dialectically, it becomes 
theoretically possible for the superstructure (including the legal 
order) to change the institutions that shape the base and hence 
the economic base itself. Had they pursued that option, Marxists 
might have developed a useful legislative theory. In fact, they 
did not. Lacking an explicit theory to guide the formulation of 
laws to transform institutions using reason informed by experience, 
some Marxist leaders sought other ways to block tendencies towards 
restoration of capitalist state power. Lenin turned to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat which, over time, rationalized 
others' harshly authoritarian methods; Mao urged struggle through 
a Cultural Revolution which, withut criteria or procedures 
structured by the rule of law, enabled opportunists to grasp the 
reins of state power for personal advancement (xx) . Elsewhere in 
the third world, in the end, inherited institutions too often 
merely co-opted the new governors (cf Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987:75). 
Seidmans: The Present State of Legislative Theory 15 
Pluralists, public choice theorists and Marxists: As 
legislation's informing principle, all celebrated not reason 
informed by experience, but power. In effect, they told drafters 
not how to develop laws to transform dysfunctional institutions, 
but to leave policy decisions to those in power. The neo-
republicans proved no more successful. 
B. NEC-REPUBLICANISM 
In the late 1980s, calling themselves 'neo-republicans', a 
small group of U. S. academics sought to resurrect the political 
theory associated with libertarianism (Sunstein, 1988; see 
Gauvin, 1994). The political scientists began with description 
and ended with prescription; the neo-republicans frankly espoused 
normative theory. They urged law-makers to employ deliberation 
in the context of solving problems for the common good (Sunstein 
1988) . Whatever their 'true' motives, the supporters and 
detractors of legislation alike must frame their discussion in 
terms of the public weal (Gauvin, 1994). They would know what 
constituted the public weal through the exercise of 'practical 
reason'-- that is, the use of judgment or intuition in 
determining what constitues a good law (see, e.g., Farber and 
Frickey, 1~1645-46; Kronman, 1985: 1605-06; cf. Llewellyn, 
,AA. \(_OMCW' g, --\:\;IOV'-{- ' · , , 
ll/397). 
'Judgment' or 'intuition,' however, provides a poor 
substitute for a legislative theory. 15 Neo-republicanism did 
15 Cf. Macintyre, 1984: 69 (" ... the introduction of the word 
'intuition' by a moral philosopher signals that something has gone 
badly wrong with the argument.") 
Seidmans: The Present State of Legislative Theory 16 
little more than to tell the drafters to rely on their own 
'values'. Without a theory, neo-republicanism shouted its well-
meant exhortations in the face of the unhearing wind. Mainstream 
policy science methodologies did not even oppose the prevailing 
wind. 
C. METHODOLOGIES FOR DECISION 
Substantive theory cannot divorce itself from methodology (a 
concept encompassing both the uses of theory and the agenda of 
steps proposed for using it) . This section reviews the 
methodologies immanent or explicit in the several theories 
discussed, or proposed by practitioners of that imprecisely-
defined discipline called 'policy science'. 
1. The uses of theory. 
An adequate legislative theory must guide drafters in the 
formulation of laws to resolve social problems. Since all law 
takes place in a very time-and-place- specific world, that calls 
for empirical research into extant reality. Most theories 
discussed above bottomed decision not on empirical research, but 
on ideal-type models: In pluralist or public choice models, 
interest-group bargaining and the role of state officials; in the 
base-superstructure model, a class-dominated society. The 
sociological and law and economics theories likewise incorporated 
ideal-type models of human behavior in the face of a law. Using 
their ideal-type model as a metaphor for the world, all these 
theories' authors tended to prescribe policies in terms of that 
metaphor. 
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Law and economics perhaps did so most egregiously. Adopting 
neoclassical economics's competitive market model, in effect, 
they identified real-world situations with some market-like 
characteristics (and what aspects of the real world have none 
such?) (see, e.g., Posner, 1989). They then consulted not the 
real world, but their model, and prescribed for the real world 
the policies that the model recommended. 1 6 Dr Makgetla observed 
that they acted like a lover who declared his love to be a red, 
red rose -- and then wooed her with what red, red roses enjoy: 
dew and well-rotted fertilizer (Makgetla, 1994; cf. Bentham, 
1931:69 ["metaphors are not reasons"]). 
As the realist model teaches (Fig. 1, below), to succeed in 
changing the behaviours it addresses, legislation must take into 
account real-world constraints and resources. Ideal types do not 
make it. More: In effect, their use adopts an ends-means 
methodology. 
2. Agendas for decision-making. 
Two methodologies have engendered countless legislative 
misfires: ends-means, and incrementalism. 
a. Ends-means. All the theories discussed above -- that 
is, the overwhelming majority of theories relating to legislation 
-- employ an ends-means methodology. Pluralism, for example, 
holds that the claims and demands of the participating interest 
groups should determine laws' ends. Law and economics sets its 
1 6 The drafters of the Truth-in-Lending Act (Rubin, 1993) and 
the Truth-in-Savings Act (Gauvin, 1994) did precisely that. 
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objective (an ideal-type market) without seriously considering 
the real world circumstances within which the legislation must 
function (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978; Posner, 1986; cf. Gouvin, 
1994; Rubin, 1993). The values of high-level authorities 
determine a bill's ends (cf Weber, 1949); empirical research only 
concerns means. 17 Perceiving ends as lying beyond empirical 
e x amination validates an authoritarian decision-making process: 
Those with power determine the ends. More: it denies any need to 
ensure that the law's stipulated ends respond to its addressees' 
circumstances. 
b. Incrementalism. Adopting an empiricist focus, another 
set of theorists proposed designing legislation based on a sort 
of vulgar pragmatism that some called 'creeping incrementalism' 
(Lindblom 1959, 1963). Implicitly, they rejected the possibility 
of devising a theory to guide the formulation of legislation to 
aid efforts to transform inherited institutions. 1 8 To avoid 
the dangers of catastrophic errors, they held that good policy 
moved towards the identified objective the least possible amount. 
Deng Xiao Ping expressed the same notion when he urged Chinese 
1 7 That proposition rests on positivism's assumed sharp 
discontinuity between facts and values. 
1 8 Identifying 'theory' with neoclassical economics and its 
political science analogues, this set of theorists (call them basic 
needs/structuralists) expressed a general distrust for grand theory 
(Seers 1970; Hirschman 1970; Seidman and Seidman, supra n. xx, Ch. 
5). Without an alternative theoretical perspective, however, they 
often fell back on market-oriented strategies (cf. Seers 1981:160). 
As Keynes observed, "Practical men, who believe themselves to be 
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist" (quoted in Clark & Juma, 
1987:frontispiece). 
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policy-makers to creep across the river by feeling the stones 
with their feet. That approach implied that drafters should 
formulate bills requiring the smallest possible changes in 
e x isting institutions. Unfortunately, however, muddling through 
may serve polities with no need for institutional transformation; 
it will not do for polities looking to re-invent themselves. 
Like interest group and class-based legislative theories, 
both ends-means and incrementalism pandered to power. Not reason 
informed by experience} but the claims and demands of the ~ 
powerful determine what bills the law-makers enact. Absent a 
successful bargain, interest groups and ruling classes turn to 
force to make good their claims . Neither political scientists 
nor policy theorists produced much to help drafters formulate 
laws looking to institutional transformation. The American 
realist model at least held hopes for such a guide. 
D. THE REALIST LEGACY: SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AND LAW 
AND ECONOMICS AS LEGISLATIVE THEORIES 
The American legal realists focussed on how to explain 
behaviour in the face of a rule of law. They addressed the right 
question; that issue must lie at the heart of a legislative 
theory to guide drafters in designing transformatory legislation . 
Unless drafters understand how law affects behaviors, they cannot 
draft laws likely to change them. Realism's descendants, 
however, wrangled about the principal factors influencing 
behaviour. This section reviews the realist model and its most 
prominent descendants, the law and society and law and econ omics 
schools. 
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1. American legal realism. 
The realists explicitly recognized the pervasive 
contradiction between the behaviors that the laws prescribe ('the 
law-in-the - books') and actual behaviors i~~e face of those laws 
~-~·" ('the law-in-action') (Llewellyn, l . Fi.g. 1 captures their 
'2'. -Z-.1.:..: L. I '7 A: . \ 12-"" P..' _ _. t '?{vl 
notion of the general categories likely to explain social actors' 
behaviors in the face of existing law. 
============================================================== 
FIG. 1: LAW AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
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In effect, into analytical positivism's perception of the 
legal order the realists folded a behavioral model suggested by 
anthropology. Classical analytical positivism -- the dominant 
19th Century school of jurisprudence -- had adopted Hans Kelsen's 
concept that lawmakers issue norms that address a set of role 
occupants, 19 and simultaneously direct agencies 
(administrators, courts, police) to implement them (Bentham, 
1970:144; Kelsen 1961:58-64; Austin, 1834:lectures I, V). A 
19 Sociologists denote the addressee of a norm as the role 
occupant. 
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law's addressees (in Fig. 1, denoted as 'role occupants') may 
constitute every member of society ("Thou shalt not commit 
murder"); a defined class of non-officials ("No director of a 
corporation may use insider knowledge for private benefit"); or 
an official ("The Minister shall promulgate fair and reasonable 
rules for the generation and distribution of electricity"). 
21 
In effect, the realists combined this perception of the 
legal order as a system of norms (unconnected to society) with an 
anthropological model (Barth 1966) in which, confronted by a rule 
of law, role occupants choose how to behave in light of all the 
constraints and resources of their country-specific 
circumstances. The realist model thus suggests that these 
include four sets of factors: (a) the rule itself; (b) the 
sanctions the role occupant expects the law-implementing agency 
will impose; (c) the non-legal constraints and resources of the 
role-occupant's milieu; and (d) feedback from role-occupants. To 
generate middle-level hypotheses to explain role occupants' 
behaviors in the face of a rule (and thus to guide the empirical 
research required to warrant them) , the realist model prescribes 
consideration of all four categories. 
In this model, law appears as an interrelated system. It 
contains not only rules, but also, embedded in their specific 
social circumstances, lawmaking and law implementing 
institutions, sanctions, and feedback and communication systems; 
and implementing institutions. These last include not only 
courts, but also administrative agencies, government 
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corporations, the police and a myriad of others. Law-making 
institutions include not only legislatures, but also appellate 
courts, administrative agencies and others. All of these 
consist of sets of role occupants acting within their constantly-
changing country-specific circumstances. 20 
The realist model helps to explain why drafters' decisions 
to copy laws from other seemingly successful countries so often 
leads to unintended consequences. Even given the same law, role 
occupants will most probably behave differently because their 
country-circumstances generally differ (Seidman, 1978; Seidman 
and Seidman, 1 994; but see Bryde, 1976) 
The realist model, however, leaves the role occupants' arena 
of choice -- all the country-specific circumstances likely to 
influence their behaviors -- as a residuary catch-all. The 
realists' descendants -- principally, the law and sociology and 
the law and economics scholars -- disagreed about what factors to 
include in that ambiguous category . 
2. Law and society jurisprudence. 
Finding inspiration not only in realism, but also in the 
sociological school of jurisprudence (Ehrlich 1922) many 
contemporary sociologists claimed that, in general, people only 
20 Note that this model implicitly contests the irrebuttable 
assumptions held by libertarians, political science models, neo-
republicanism and 'legal process' models alike: that the law-making 
process creates rules "consciously designed to achieve social 
purposes or effectuate basic social principles'', addressed 
"universally to all individuals similarly situated", and gives 
courts "the principal responsibility for defining the effect of 
le.gal rules anefdcepts" (cf. Trubeck and Galanter, 1974: 1 071; x x J 
and Frickey, 1 xx cf Seidman & Seidman, 1995:Ch. 2). I.!) ~~vi~-e ,· ~ 
YV'rC>~1 -lCC~ 
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obey laws that match their values and attitudes (Cranston 1987; 
Friedman 1969; Packer 1969:262; Sumner 1962; Roche and Gordon 
1955:10; Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 551). Lawrence 
Friedman (1969:34) added that people behave in accord with their 
'legal culture,' "the values and attitudes which bind the system 
together." That led to yet another paradox: If people's values 
and attitudes conduce to agreement with a law, even without the 
law they will behave as the law prescribes; if not, they will not 
obey it. Why enact any law? 
In reality, values and attitudes alone usually do not 
explain behaviour. The claim that they do often rests on the 
same empirical foundation as the perception of the behavior. 2 1 
Furthermore, as the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance 
predicted (Festinger 1957), when law compells people to change 
their behaviors, in time their values and attitudes change. 22 
Undoubtedly, values and attitudes do influence behavior, but as 
the sole explanation for behavior in the face of a rule, they 
leave out too many other possible factors. 
3. Law and economics . 
Law and economics theorists advanced another monocausal 
21 For example, to 'explain' peasants' behavior, researchers 
may posit they conform to traditional values. To prove that 
hypothesis, the researchers then point to the peasants' behavior. 
2 2 To illustrate: Contrary to predictions, (Roche and Gordon 
1955:142), as laws forced US Southern schools to desegregate, bit 
by bit southern attitudes towards desegregation did change (Branch 
1988:213). Laws against speeding alter people's driving behavior, 
even if they do not obey the laws exactly (Cohen & Cohen 1977 : 589; 
Robertson 1976; Little, Inc. 1970:170). 
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category . Both the conservative (Posner 1986) and the ''liberal" 
(Markowitz 1984; Calabresi & Melmud 1972) wings claimed people 
decide whether to obey the law only in terms of self-interest. 
Claiming self-interest only finds full expression in a free, 
competitive market, these theorists maintained that every aspect 
of human society -- even those seemingly not related to economic 
concerns, like the family or adoption of children (Posner, 1989) 
-- bears an analogy to a market. In that sense, all social 
problems constitute market failures, caused by 'transaction 
costs:' difficulties of entry, market power, externalities, 
sticky factor mobility, lack of information, and so forth (Stokey 
& Zeckhauser 1978:120) . 23 
In polities where market theory controlled policy, law and 
economics frequently became a dominant guide to law-making (e.g., 
World Bank 1989a) . Critics (e.g., Makgetla and Seidman 1989; 
Samuels 1979; Leff 1974) objected that, as the principal 
explanatory category, self-interest too seems unduly restrictive. 
It takes an heroic stretch of the imagination to perceive all 
human relationships as markets. 24 To overcome the reality that 
23 This confronted the paradox that plagued neo-classical 
economics: Government intervention denies efficiency; law 
constitutes the most common sort of government intervention; yet 
the ultimate guarantor of efficiency, markets, cannot exist without 
law. To resolve that paradox, the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960) held 
that (assuming no 'transaction costs') law does not affect the 
social allocation of resources. Without fear of interfering with 
efficiency, therefore, government could and should use law to 
remedy market imperfections. 
24 In practice, law and economics scholars scurry about 
trying to create markets where none exist (e.g., Landes and Posner 
1987; Stroup and Baden 1973:308). 
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many behaviors do not seem motivated by material self interest, 
some law and economics proponents assert that people simply 
maximize what they value (Michelman 1983; Adams 1982). This, 
however, makes the concept so general as to become useless. 
Neither sociological jurisprudence nor law and economics provided 
an adequate basis for explaining behaviour in the face of a rule 
of law. 
SUMMARY 
The third world's history reveals repeated failures of 
populist leaders efforts to use laws to transform institutions. 
At least in part, the reasons lay in the extraordinary paucity of 
legislative theory. Mainly it consisted of generalized 
statements about how existing institutions (to a surprising 
extent, existing U. S. institutions) conditioned legislative 
outcomes on interest-group or class struggles, elevated into 
theories that proclaimed the inevitability of that process. 
Implicitly, those theories told drafters that, because of their 
inherent nature, law-making institutions could only produce laws 
to bolster existing power allocations and institutional 
structures. Law as a device for revolutionary change became a 
chimera. The use of theory as metaphor and of ends-means and 
incrementalist methodologies, too, buttressed power and 
privilege. Only the legal realists addressed the right qu estion, 
but their legacy ran aground on the limited insights of law and 
society and law and economics jurisprudence. 
An adequate legislative theory poses two demands: That it 
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guide lawmakers in writing laws to use, not ethnic or nationalist 
bias or intuition, but reason and experience, and that it 
facilitate participation. When, without popular participation in 
governance, elites run things, at the end of the day they run 
things in their own interests. People-oriented development 
demands mass participation not only in periodic, representative 
elections but also in ongoing governmental decisions. An 
adequate legislative theory for development must guide 
investigations in a way that facilitates popular participation. 
Because it proclaims that anyone with better reasons or better 
data can challenge authority, only a legislative theory that 
rests on reason informed by experience can simultaneously 
facilitate participation and lead to results based on thinking 
with the head rather than with the blood. 
IV. THE COMPONENTS OF AN ADEQUATE LEGISLATIVE THEORY 
This final part identifies the components required for a 
legislative theory to guide the development of a democratic law-
making process capable of generating legislation designed b y 
reason informed by experience, with the widest possioble popular 
participation. It first explores law's role in changing the 
institutional behaviors that comprise social difficulties; 
second, it explains why competent drafting requires competent 
research reports; and, third, it reviews two of the three 
elements of an appropriate theory. 
A. LAW, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, INSTITUTIONS, BEHAVIORS. 
Groups and classes struggle to command state power because 
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the state, through law backed by adequate enforcement, comprises 
an organized polity's primary means of solving constantly 
emerging social problems (Gauvin 1994:1283) and hence of 
effectuating consciously-determined social change. Third world 
social problems often appear in the form of distorted resource 
allocations (see Seidman & Seidman, 1994:Chs 1, 2): national 
dependence on the export of one or a few crude or labor-intensive 
manufactured goods produced by poorly-paid labor; increasingly 
heavy foreign debt burdens; skewed income distributions, with a 
few wealthy people capturing as much as half the national income, 
leaving a third to half the population on starvation's verge; low 
productivity; sky rocketing inflation; un- and under-employment -
- an endless list. However, law cannot alter resource 
allocations directly. No more than King Canute could command 
the tide to stand still can law command the economy to produce 
diverse products, the foreign debt burden to reduce itself, or 
incomes to equalize. 
Law cannot directly address resource allocations; it can 
only address social behaviours. To change resource allocations, 
therefore, governments can only try to alter the social actors' 
repetitive patterns of behaviours that, by definition, comprise 
the institutions which shape them (Homans 1967) : Commercial farm 
and mine owners and managers employing thousands of low paid 
migrant workers to produce exports; peasants, often women, using 
outmoded technologies to produce subsistence crops; trading 
companies' managers purchasing crops and minerals to ship 
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overseas, and importing machinery, equipment and luxury consumer 
items for those who can afford them; bank personnel lending money 
to finance enterprises they deem profitable. To change those 
behaviors, governments have only one tool: the law. 25 
It follows that an adequate legislative theory must guide 
the formulation of laws likely to lead to desired changes of 
social behaviors. Legislative theory based on reason info rmed by 
experience serves that purpose better than (no matter how 
ardently embraced) religious belief, ethnic fervor, or 
ideological purity, whether of left or right. At the same time, 
an adequate legislative theory describes the content of an 
adequate justification for particular laws. 
B. THE FUNCTION OF THEORY AND 
THE REQUIREMENT OF A RESEARCH REPORT 
A legislative theory that adequately guides the research on 
which effective laws must rest simultaneously provides a 
structure for research reports which justify the bills. The 
realist model of law and behavior (Fig. 1) emphasizes that 
relevant role occupants' behaviors depend, not merely on the 
law's dictates, but also upon the constraints and resources in 
their environment. Without an adequate legislative theory, 
drafters' research cannot know what facts to gather. 26 Only a 
2 5 To reiterate: Law, here, is broadly conceived to include, 
not only legislative formally enacted by legislatures, but all the 
rules and regulations6:·n- oduced by government agencies at all 
levels. See text at n. xx 
26 Allison (1971) escribes theory as a net which determines 
what facts researchers catch. 
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detailed knowledge of the relevant social actors' environment as 
described in a research report can provide an adequate basis for 
assessing a bill's quality. 27 Well-designed research reports 
serve to structure both the drafters' research and the decision -
makers' assessments of bills. In this sense, the contents of the 
research report becomes a surrogate for a legislative theory. 
C. THE COMPONENTS OF AN ADEQUATE LEGISLATIVE THEORY 
\ 
Like every other kind, legislative theory contains three 
components: A methodology, a set of explanatory categories, and 
a perspective. To economize space, the following discusses only 
two of these: a problem-solving methodology and explanatory 
categories: 28 
1. A problem-solving methodology. 
To solve social problems through law requires a probl em-
solving methodology consisting offour steps, each bottomed on 
logical analysis coupled with relevant facts. "Problem-solving 
lies at the heart of the legislative enterprise"; and competent 
problem-solving starts with rigorously identifying the problem 
27 The alternatives comprise personal experience and 
prejudice, both famously unreliable. 
28 Perspectives concern the discretionary choices made in the 
course of problem-solving, policy-oriented research. In our sense 
of the word, large-scale explanations for the world, like Marxism, 
or neo-classical economics, do not constitute all of theory, but 
only its perspectives component. (Rather uinsatsfactorily we call 
these 'Grand Theory'). Some believe that Grand Theory constitutes 
not a large-scale explanation, but a lrage- ale description of the 
world, so accurate a metaphor that one c a ely use it to dictate 
policy. We disagree (supra, text at n. xx). Control over those 
discretionary choices constitutes Grad heory's true offic e 
(Seidman and Seidman, 1994, Ch. 5). 
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addressed (Gouvin, 1994:1375). A social problem consists of 
behaviors (supra: 27-28). For legislative purpose, therefore, 
the methodology requires first stating precisely whose and what 
behaviours comprise that social problem, and presenting evidence 
to warrant those statements. (As a cause of their inadequacy for 
drafting purposes, ends-means and incrementalism do not require 
this essential first step) . 
As its second step, problem-solving requires analyzing the 
causes of the identified role occupants' problematic behaviors in 
the face of existing law. To jump from difficulty to solutions -
- as do both ends-means and incrementalism (e.g., Rubin, 1993) 
leads only to unsubstantiated normative prescriptions, supported 
mainly by unenforceable punitive sanctions (supra: 3). To avoid 
that usually bootless result, proposed laws must incorporate 
sufficiently detailed measures designed to alter or eliminate 
the causes of the problematic social behaviors, typically rooted 
in country-specific circumstances. To ground proposed laws in 
reason informed by experience, therefore, thelegislative theory 
must guide the formulation of explanatory hypotheses of those 
causes which, in turn, will guide the search for the data 
required to falsify them. 29 
29 Legislative drafters must always assess the causes of 
behavior in the face of existing law (including a lack of specific 
rules governing that behavior); in that sense, they must gather 
data, whether from secondary or (if not otherwise available) 
primary sources that enables them to evaluate alternative possible 
explanations for that behavior. Thus they must become as a minimum 
'good consumers,' able to evaluate of available data; and in cases 
where no relevant data exists, they need to know enough to help 
design methods appropriate for gathering it. This calls for a 
Seidmans: The Present State of Legislative Theory 31 
The third step consists of generating a proposal for 
solution, that is, draft legislation. The problem-solving 
methodology's strength rests in its requirement that the 
difficulty and solution remain linked logically and empirically 
by way of the explanatory stage. 30 To generate an adequate 
legislative plan, the drafters must consider the range of 
alternative solutions that logically seem likely to change or 
eliminate the causes of the role occupants' problematic 
behaviors; choose between those solutions on the basis of the 
available facts as to their probable relative social costs and 
benefits; and, finally, demonstrate empirically that the proposed 
law will likely effectively address each cause the warranted 
explanations identify. 
As the realist model shows, the proposed law must 
effectively address the issue of implementation. Except 
serendipitously, a plan for legislation than does not include 
adequate provisions to ensure its implementation will yield only 
knowledge of relevant social science methods, particularly those 
increasingly used in the emerging evaluation profession (For a 
review of evaluation theories and methods, eg, see Shadish, Cook & 
Leviton, 1991; Smelser and Gerstein, 1986; and Cronback et al, 
1980) . 
30 Drafters cannot possibly provide warranted facts as to 
what a proposed solution (law) will achieve; until the law's 
enactment and implementation, no facts can exist as to its 
consequences. However, once having provided facts that prove the 
validity of explanations as to the problematic behaviors' causes, 
drafters can then design solutions logically likely to overcome 
those causes. 
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symbolic law. 31 Drafters cannot properly avoid accountability 
for their drafts by pleading, "We wrote a good law, but those 
guys failed to implement it." Instead, they must select or 
design appropriate institutions to implement their proposed laws; 
if necessary, they must ensure improvement of existing 
institutions' capacities by introducing new criteria and 
procedures, additional financial, personnel and physical 
resources, and training. 
The final problem-solving step consists of implementing the 
new legislation, and monitoring and evaluating it. No 
legislation ever succeeds exactly as expected. The initial 
research may have failed to reveal all the causes of problematic 
behaviors; the circumstances that cause them may -- indeed, as 
the transformation process proceeds, probably will -- change. In 
either event, the new law's implementation may lead to new 
problematic social behaviors. For one or both of these reasons, 
competent drafting requires including in the bill provisions for 
evaluation and feedback to the law-makers as a necessary if not 
sufficient condition to ensure the law's timely amendment or 
revision. 32 
Since problem-solving rests on explanations as the crucial 
31 Law that provides a symbol of government's proclaimed good 
intentions, but without effective provisions for its 
implementation -- remains without substance. 
32 Legislative drafters need the same kinds of research 
skills this purpose as those they require to assess (or gather) 
data to test explanatory hypotheses for problematic behavi or that 
must underpin any effort to draft a legislative solution to a 
social problem (see footnote 29 above) . 
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link between difficulty and solution, an adequate legislative 
theory must provide appropriate set of categories to guide the 
generation of hypotheses as to possible causes of role occupants' 
problematic behaviors. 
2. Categories. 
Legislative theory guides the search for data by guiding 
drafters in the formulation of hypotheses. In turn, those 
hypotheses provide the drafters with a 'map' of the evidence they 
need to falsify their explanations. The concepts ('categories', 
'vocabulary') specified by the theory aim to spark off all the 
possible hypotheses that might help to explain the difficulty at 
hand. The categories appropriate for legislative theory must 
help drafters identify the factors likely to cause problematic 
social behaviors in the face of a law. In this sense, a theory's 
categories provide an agenda for legislative research. 
The realists' model (Fig. 1) suggests several categories for 
explaining role occuupants' problematic social behaviors in the 
face of a rule of law: The rule; feedback; the role occupants' 
country-specific constraints and resources; and the implementing 
agency's actions. Of these, however, two (the country-specific 
constraints and resources, and the implementing agency's 
behaviors) constitute residual categories far too ambiguous to 
assist researchers in identifying specific causal hypotheses. 
This section discusses the need to structure both of these 
categories of explanations more precisely for inclusion in a more 
adequate legislative theory. 
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a. The ROCCIPI research agenda. Outlined below, the 
ROCCIPI research agenda suggessts sub=categories that seem to 
capture all the possible non-legal factors likely to influence 
role occupants' behaviors: 
(i). The Rules. People act within a cage of laws that both 
constrain and enlarge the range of role-occupant choice. 33 A 
law's failure to induce desired behavior may reflect an 
inadequate formulation. Do the law's words specify precisely the 
desired behavior, or only provide vague guidelines? Does the law 
specify adequate implementation procedures backed by sufficient 
resources for enforcement? Does it require monitoring of the 
implementation process? 
(ii). The Requirements of Choice. Only when circumstances 
force role-occupants to choose do they consciously decide whether 
or not to obey a law. Role-occupants consciously choose whether 
to obey a law only when three additional categories of factors 
coincide: 
(a) Their environment provides them the opportunity to 
choose to obey or disobey; 34 
(b) They have the capacity to obey, that is, they 
possess the skills and resources to perform the 
task the law prescribes; and 
(c) They know about the rule; that is, the authorities 
33 For example, water polluters act not only in light of the 
rules conventionally labelled 'water pollution law' or 
'environmental law', but also property law, contract law, water 
law, tax law, constitutional law, and many others. 
34 For example, a banker has many opportunities to embezzle 
other people's money; a poor person very few. 
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have adequately communicated it to them. 35 
(iii). Interest. Law and economics had it at least partly 
right: Material incentives and disincentives plainly do i n fluence 
behavior. These may include direct penalties or rewards the law 
provides (although role-occupants consider not only the law-in-
the-books, but the likelihood that implementing authorities will 
enforce them [Bernstein 1955; cf. Jaffe 1956:1068]). They may 
also include the indirect benefits or disadvantages the law 
introduces. 
(iv) . Process. Whether role-occupants, as individuals or in 
collectivities, obey a law depends in part upon the process by 
which they reach their decision. Role occupants who make 
decisions in secret, for example, will likely make different 
decisions than if they must make public their reasons. 
(v) . Subjective factors ("ideology") . The sociologists, 
too, had it partly right: Obviously, people's world views do 
influence their actions. Social sentiments commonly sway role 
occupants' choices. More pervasively, actors' actions acquire 
meaning only in the context of their own subjective 
understandings, what Gouldner (1970) called their ''domain 
assumptions" (see also Schutz 1965:60, 62; Weber 1949:32ff; 
Parsons 1949:26). To explain any particular role occupants' 
35 This seemingly obvious requirement raises many questions 
for investigation: Does the law's wording adequately communicate 
the law-makers' intention? (Rubin 1989:408 et seq.; Thornton 1987; 
Driedger 1983; Allott 1980:36-37; Ilbert 1914; Thring 1902). Does 
the way law-makers publicize the law ensure that its addressees 
know of their intention? (Seidman, R. B. 1972:680; Robertson & 
Teitlebaum 1973:665, 695ff; Gifford 1970:409). 
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behavior, researchers must comprehend their commonly-held beliefs 
and the socially-acquired and transmitted norms (Ellickson 1986; 
Moore & Anderson 1965:72). 
These seven categories seem to encompass all the possible 
factors likely to influence role occupants' behaviors, and hence 
to provide drafters with an adequate research agenda. (The 
mnemonic, ROCCIPI, helps to remember them: Rule, Qpportunity, 
Qapacity, Qommunication, ~nterest, ~rocess and ~deology.) In 
considering each category, 36 law-makers should critically assess 
all the middle-level propositions suggested by alternative grand 
theories (Seidman & Seidman, Ch. 5), and incorporate the 
potentially most fruitful in their hypotheses. Once warranted by 
the evidence (or, more likely, revised in light of the evidence), 
the explanations thus generated logically suggest changes in laws 
likely to induce more desireable behavior. 
b. Ensuring effective implementation. The Realist model 
teaches that the commonly heard assertion, "We have good laws, 
but they remain badly implemented," constitutes an oxymoron: 
Good law must make provision for its own effective 
implementation. To guide drafters in designing measures for 
effective implementation, an adequate legislative theory must 
provide categories helpful in generating hypotheses to explain 
agencies' 'behaviors' that contribute to their failure to 
36 Sometimes, consideration of explanations in one or more 
category may seem superfluous. For example, law-makers usually 
communicate relevant rules and their contents to key role 
occupants, officials, in government implementing agencies. 
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implement existing laws effectively. 
As the addressees of rules, in a sensel implementing 
agencies constitute role occupants whose behavior the ROCCIPI 
categories may help to generate hyptheses to explain. By 
designation of an entire agency as a role occupant, however, too 
easily seduces researchers to 'explain' 'its behaviors' as those 
of a single rational actor (Allison 1971:32ff): For example, 
"the Federal Reserve Board believed that inflation required 
higher interest rates",' or "to protect U.S. copyright owners, 
the President ordered an embargo of Chinese merchandise." In 
reality, implementing agencies comprise complex institutions 
involving the interacting behaviors of several sets of 
participants whose behaviors researchers can adequately explain 
only by understanding the agencies' detailed decision-making 
processes. 
An input-output systems model (Fig. 2) helps to unpack those 
processes. 37 
Fig 2: MODEL OF AN AGENCY'S COMPLEX DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
input 
processes 
conversion 
processes 
output 
processes 
37 The conventional input-output decision-making model explains 
particular decisions by examination of how particular inputs, 
feedbacks and conversion process worked in that instance (e.g., 
Huse 1975:35). Bachrach & Baratz (1963:632) argued this model 
fails to explain "non-decisions", issues which never even enter the 
system. That model ensures that research based on it never produces 
outputs that threaten power structures. The model in Fig. 2 aims 
to avoid that problem by examining the processes and structures 
that not only determine decisions, but what issues the system 
excludes and why (Seidman, R. B. 1978:194). 
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feedback processes 
Fig. 2 underscores the systematic interrelationships 
between an implementation agency's decisions and its structures 
and processes (Huse 1975:37), showing how its decisions 
('outputs') depend upon the way the institution's processes 
define: 1) the inputs (issues, facts, theories, personnel) 
decision-makers consider; 2) the feedbacks they receive about 
previous decisions' effects; and 3) the conversion processes, 
that is, the way they combine these elements to reach decision . 
Law-makers' choice of implementing structures and processes 
ought to depend in main part38 upon the substantive outputs they 
desire. No institution can implement an unlimited range of 
policies. The structure and processes of each agency may reflect 
the policy-makers' purposes, but their particular characteristics 
also influence the actual policies the agency implements. 39 
That helps to explain significant social, political and economic 
transformation requires fundamental alteration of existing 
government institutions as undertaken by the post -
revolutionary American and French governments. Lenin (1927) 
called for "smashing the bourgeois state." Less dramatically 
but more to the point, transformation requires fundamentally 
38 In part, they also depend upon the procedural protections 
desired in the decision-making process; e.g. , in the criminal 
justice system, the privilerge against self-incrimination. 
39 That self-evidently runs counter to the oft-repeated claim 
that a well-designed civil service can function equally well for 
any government anywhere. 
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altering the input, feedback and conversion processes of the 
state's implementing institutions. 
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A government agency's processes consists of role occupants 
sometimes a great many role occupants -- interacting in the face 
of express or implied rules that purport to define their 
activities. Unpacking those processes reveals which officials' 
behaviors explain agency decisions. Fig. 2 therefore suggests an 
e x tended research agenda to guide drafting laws to restructure 
state implementing institutions. Law-makers must: (1) identify 
the role occupants who occupy central positions in each state 
institution's input, feedback and conversion systems; and (2) 
given the existing rules addressing those role occupants, utilize 
the ROCCIPI categories to generate plausible hypotheses to 
explain their behaviors and to direct the search for evidence . 
On that foundation, they can then design new rules likely to 
ensure effective implementation. 
This focus on implementing agencies' processes has 
significant implications for formulating and enacting laws likely 
to foster a democratic, participatory legal order. Above all, 
at every point, law-makers must try to design open, accountable 
implementing agencies' processes to: (1) ensure that all the 
people enjoy the opportunity and capacity to provide inputs and 
feedback to those agencies' decision-makers; and (2) incorporate 
criteria and procedures likely to direct the decision-makers' 
conversion of those inputs into outputs that serve the majority's 
needs. Without processes that facilitate community participation 
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in agencies' policy-making, law-makers deprive themselves of 
their best potential source of information about role-occupant 
behaviour (that is, the role-occupants themselves). Without 
participation, too easily the elite warp decisions in their own 
interest (Seidman and Seidman, Chs. 8, 9). 
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Together, Figs. 1 and 2, together with the ROCCIPI 
categories, the problem-solving methodology and an appropriate 
perspective, provide the components of an adequate legislative 
theory: An agenda to guide law-makers (including drafters) in 
undertaking the investigations necessary to ensure that the bills 
they produce will likely achieve proposed social transformations. 
Analysis of these categories stresses that transformatory 
legislation must rest on careful investigations of all the facts 
relating to each country's specific circumstances. At every 
step, the problem-solving agenda that lies at the theory's very 
core requires the utilization of reason informed by experi ence. 
Operationally, that requires that competent legislation come 
accompanied by a research report informed by an adequate 
perspective and structured by a problem-solving methodology and 
appropriate categories related to the causes of law addressees' 
behaviors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the most part, neither legal theorists nor practitioners 
give much attention, if any, to formulating a legislative theory 
adequate to guide law-makers seeking to use the state and law to 
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transform their countries' existing economic institutions. The 
reasons seem imbedded in the practitioners' myth that legislative 
drafting constitutes a mere technical skill, legal academia's 
focus on law as related to the courts' dispute settlement role, 
and on the ideological force of free market and positivst 
philosophies. 
Further, it remains difficult to tease an adequate 
legislative theory out of cognate fields. Political scientists 
and political economists tended to elevate into the realms of 
theory their descriptions of existing law-making institutions' 
functions. Policy-making studies did much the same thing: They 
incorporated the authoritarian practice of contemporary 
institutions into ends-means and incrementalist methodologies. 
Only the legal realists offered sounder foundations on which an 
adequate theory might build. 
Development requires laws likely to carry out development's 
transformational imperatives. That requires the use of theory, 
not as a metaphor, but as a guide to the factual investigations 
on which competent bills must rest. An adequate legislative 
theory must recognize the limits as well as the possibilities of 
using law to change problematic behaviors. It must generate 
explanations warranted by investigations into the country-
specif ic factors that explain problematic behaviors in the face 
of existing law. Above all, it must rest upon logic and facts, 
or, more abstractly, reason informed by experience. 
This paper aimed to propose such a legislative theory. As 
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the framework for research, it suggests a four-step, problem-
solving methodology; to guide discretionary choice in problem-
solving, the use not of intuition or 'values' but in-principle-
testable Grand Theory (Seidman & Seidman, ch.5); to generate 
hypotheses to guide data-capturing, the realist model, the 
ROCCIPI research agenda, and a strong emphasis on implementation. 
To ensure that law-makers enact laws grounded in reason informed 
by experience, those drafting them must accompany their bills 
with reports that describe the research findings on which they 
rest. The quality of the research determines the quality of the 
bill. 
Everywhere, third world peoples have proven more successful 
in capturing state power than in using it. Failures to use law 
to transform institutions and the societies those institutions 
define litter development's rocky road. To avoid those failures 
requires of course a measure of good fortune. A country too 
easily can squander its good fortune, however, unless it 
consistently invokes democratic participation in governance, and 
unless it guides its practice by a legislative theory resting on 
reason informed by experience. 
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